Conflict Resolution|International|Negotiation

Chinese Negotiation

The second student paper addresses negotiation in China.  The author, Justin Shain, lived in China for a period.  What makes this paper so appealing is the ease and authority with which various strains of the robust Chinese culture are woven into a clear and useful piece of guidance for the business person and counsel.

How to Successfully Negotiate in an Ever-changing Chinese Business Culture

 Justin Shain

INTRODUCTION

As the ancient Chinese military general and strategist, Sun Tzu, wisely coined, “He who knows his enemy and himself well will not be defeated easily.”[1]  This proverb has stood the test of time.  For example, this saying continues to apply to many negotiators today—specifically, negotiators finding themselves in the middle of cross-cultural business dealings between Chinese companies and companies from the West.  In order to be successful in these negotiations, western negotiators have extensively studied Chinese business culture.  Likewise, the Chinese are increasingly sending their youth to be educated by western business schools.[2]  First, this paper will explore the widely accepted Chinese business culture framework, called the “Ping Pong Model,” in order to establish a better understanding of the Chinese negotiator, followed by how, in practice, these widely accepted generalizations of the Chinese business culture framework do not always hold true because of changes in attitudes among China’s younger generations.  The essay concludes by providing a guide on how to apply negotiating to this evolving Chinese business culture.

THE “PING PONG MODEL”

            In 1999, Tony Fang established a framework for Chinese business culture called the “Ping Pong Model.”[3]  This model is now widely accepted by academics and business people alike.[4]  It is also widely accepted that China is, as Hofstede theorized in a 1980 study, a “high context culture,” meaning that there is more focus on the group rather than individual interests.[5]  The “Ping Pong Model,” which is a model that supports China being characterized as a high context, establishes an explanation of Chinese business culture.  This Chinese business culture consists of three main components: (1) the concept of guo qing or the PRC Condition; (2) Religion; and (3) Sun Tze’s 36 Chinese stratagems.[6]  These three components should help us better understand a Chinese negotiator’s way of thinking.

Guo Qing

Regarding the first component, guo qing is the concept of China’s cultural heritage as a result of rapid political, economic and social change during the 20th century.[7]  In other words, guo qing is a contemporary social and institutional factor influencing China today.[8]  Guo qing can be broken down into eight distinct variables.  (1) Politics.  As a socialist state, politics plays an influential role on every aspect of Chinese life.  Thus, business and politics cannot be separated.  (2) Economic planning.  Chinese enterprises are not independent, private economic entities.  The Chinese economy is quite centralized, and hence, there is strong government control.  (3) Legal framework.  China’s legal system is still unstable.  Therefore, it is unwise to rely on the law to solve business disputes.  (4) Technology.  China wants advanced western technologies.  (5) Great size.  China’s state policy is to exchange China’s large market (1.3 billion plus population) for advanced foreign technologies.  (6) Backwardness.  China is still relatively poor, with 300 million people living below the UN poverty level.  Furthermore, the disparity of wealth is alarming, with most of the wealth falling only into the hands of the very rich.  (7) Rapid change.  Today, Maoist and traditional Chinese cultural values are forced to coexist with western ideas and lifestyles.  (8) Bureaucracy.  There is red tape for everything.  Negotiators must comply with Chinese government policies in order to plan their business.[9]

Religion

The second component, religion, is a combination of the three major “religions” or philosophical foundations that influence Chinese thought: Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism.  It is well settled that there are six core values of Confucianism from the perspective of negotiation: moral cultivation; importance of interpersonal relationships; family orientation; respect for seniority and hierarchy; pursuit of harmony and avoidance of conflict; and the concept of face.[10]  In addition to these six core Confucian values, the three philosophical foundations together provide for two other cultural elements that contribute to Chinese negotiation styles: being thrifty; and enduring to the end and being relentless.[11]

Starting with the six core Confucian values, the first is (1) Moral cultivation.  This value deems trust and sincerity among the most important qualities of being human, and it expects that a ruler govern his or her state by means of moral persuasion instead of law.[12]  The second value, (2) Guanxi, is one of the most influential factors.  Guanxi is this idea of the need for interpersonal relationships.  Guanxi roughly translated is relationships, connections, contacts.[13]  Guanxi derives from the cultural necessity of living in self-supporting communities.[14]  In China, it’s all about who you know, and developing these relationships can happen anywhere from attending school with someone, to knowing the family, to business networking.[15]  The third value is (3) Family orientation (Zhengti guannian).  This involves thinking about the whole country and not the individual business, or individual person.[16]  Eastern cultures think more about the community, while western cultures emphasize the importance of the individual.  The next core value is (4) Respect for seniority and hierarchy (Shehui Dengji).  This is the simple concept of showing great respect for one’s superiors; casual business relationships do not fare well in China.[17]  (5) Pursuit of harmony and avoidance of conflict (Renji Hexie) make up the fifth core Confucian value.  This involves the need for interpersonal harmony by being charismatic and easy-going.[18]  The last core value is (6) The preservation of “face” or mianzi.  This is the preservation of composure and lack of embarrassment.[19]

Two additional elements contribute to Chinese negotiation style, as well.  These are the concepts of jiejian and chiku nailaoJiejian means thrift.  It has been embedded in Chinese culture because China was once a very poor nation where families had little belongings.  In fact, the Chinese save almost four times as much as the typical American.  This means that the Chinese often leave more negotiation room in their offers than Americans.  Chiku nailao means enduring to the end and being relentless.  This is evidenced by the work ethic of the Chinese.  The Chinese tend to be very diligent, tenacious and persistent.[20]

Chinese Stratagems

The last major component that makes up Chinese business culture derives from Sun Tzu’s treatise, The Art of War.  In this treatise on military strategy, Sun Tzu lists 36 stratagems for gaining material and psychological advantage over one’s adversary.[21]  It is important to note that this method of negotiation is usually invoked only when trust between the parties is low.[22]  The use of these stratagems is used to handle hostile opponents or outsiders.[23]  Keeping all of this in mind, it is important to be cognizant of these stratagems in the event one is confronted with this negotiation style.

The main idea behind these 36 stratagems is how to “subdue the enemy without fighting.”[24]  The Chinese negotiator will employ these tactics to psychologically wrestle his opponent to create a favorable situation to manipulate his counterpart into doing business his way.[25]  To do this the Chinese negotiator will try to manipulate the western side through cooperation, flattery, and deception, among other things.[26]  For example, Stratagem 10 is “hide a knife in a smile,” meaning manipulation of friendship and hospitality, and Stratagem 3 is “kill with a borrowed knife,” meaning to play the competitors against each other.[27]

Although western negotiators may consider these tactics as “tricky” or unethical, things like diverting attention, misrepresenting information, and making false promises is not considered unethical within negotiations.[28]  In eastern societies, in which ethical duties are viewed as contextual, the motives for it and existing relationships can sometimes render deception virtuous.[29]  For example, Chinese negotiators might be under considerable pressure from their superiors to deceive the other side in order to advance the interest of the company.[30]

This Chinese business culture framework suggests that Chinese negotiators have a three-in-one negotiation style: that of being a “bureaucrat” (guo qing); that of being a “gentleman” (Confucianism); and that of being a “strategist” (Sun Tzu’s Chinese stratagems).[31]  Trust will determine what role the Chinese negotiator is going to play.  When mutual trust is high, Chinese negotiators will negotiate as “gentlemen,” and when trust is low, they will negotiate as “strategists.”  When politics is heavily involved, they will negotiate as “bureaucrats.”[32]  Thus, keeping all three concepts of this cultural framework in mind will only help the western negotiator understand their Chinese counterparts.

CHANGES IN CHINESE BUSINESS CULTURE

            On the one hand, the “Ping Pong Model” certainly provides western negotiators with a thorough guide on the way many Chinese negotiators operate.  On the other hand, there is no way the “Ping Pong Model” can apply to every single Chinese businessperson. This is particularly noticeable amongst today’s younger Chinese generations.  Ever since Deng Xiaoping’s “Open Door Policy” with the West, China has become flooded with western ideas and concepts.  In particular, many aspects of western business culture have left their footprint on China.[33]  The West has influenced Chinese business culture in three ways: (1) as China moves closer to a capitalist economic structure, the Chinese government has responded by decentralizing many enterprises; (2) Today’s Chinese have a more materialistic world view; and (3) The younger generations are becoming more and more aware of international business rules and cultural differences.

Before discussing these three western influences, I think it is important to point out that it is the younger generations who are particularly affected by these western influences. Within this business culture context, there is a generational distinction between older and younger Chinese.[34]  The younger generations are not as responsive to Chinese custom as their elders, and their ambition is western focused.[35]

Decentralization

Concerning the first western influence, China has seen rapid economic growth once it joined the world economy.  With that, China has adopted some western business practices—most notably Chinese enterprises are working under and increasingly capitalist-oriented Chinese government.  PRC policy now allows for limited decentralization.[36]  Cities like Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou have been designated as Special Economic Zones where private industries there are given greater latitude and flexibility in the management and operation of their businesses.[37]  As such, these economic policies are at odds with the guo qing or “PRC Condition” discussed earlier.  The Chinese government has less control in some industries.  Therefore, there may be less red tape involved and less government control in closing a business deal within these Special Economic Zones.

Materialistic Worldview

The second western influence affects today’s Chinese worldview.  Today’s Chinese are more capitalist and less ideology-oriented that the Chinese under Mao’s time.[38]  It’s this drive to get rich by whatever means necessary.[39]  “Foreigners are often stuck by the spread of a grasping, money-seeking mentality that was a far cry from the ‘serve the people’ sloganeering of the pervious period, or even what passes for normal, competitive business ethics in the West.”[40]  Furthermore, there is a gross inequality of the distribution of wealth in China, and this will challenge the political stability of the country as the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.[41]

This money-hungry mentality is quite contrary to the components laid out in the “Ping Pong Model,” in two ways.  First, this shifting mentality is contrary to Chinese philosophical foundations of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism.  Second, this mentality, which is causing more instability within the once very stable Chinese Communist Party, is altering our assumptions about guo qing.

Getting rich by whatever means necessary has caused the younger generations to stray from some Confucian core values.  For example, the Confucian principle of family orientation is fading.  This communal mindset seems to be diminishing in favor of an individualistic mindset of gaining more wealth for oneself.  Additionally, as the rich continue to get richer, the Chinese Communist Party is becoming less stable as frustration grows amongst China’s poor.  With an unstable government comes an unpredictable business landscape.  For example, guo qing tells us that the CCP has tight economic planning.  However, that assumption will change if the CCP becomes upended by an unstable domestic situation.

Conforming to International Business Rules

            In order to join the WTO, Chinese businesses were forced to make adjustments needed to gain a competitive advantage under international business rules.[42]  Having to adjust, the Chinese have become more aware of and have been utilizing western business practices.  This has been accomplished by the Chinese becoming increasingly exposed to international practices through studying abroad and being educated in western universities.[43]  As a result, Chinese negotiators have become more dynamic, which can be evidenced by the following three examples: (1) Western education has produced the Chinese “technocrat”; (2) Guanxi is less important than it was before; and (3) China is now characterized as a less “high context” culture.

Chinese business people, as they are getting better at communicating in English and as they continue to be educated by western business schools, are more receptive to “arms-length” negotiations, especially among technocrats, or technically competent officials.[44]  These technocrats are attaching greater importance to economic performance; so non-personal factors such as products, technology, and financing are becoming more important than personal or cultural factors like Guanxi.[45]

This leads me to my next point—that Guanxi is not as important as it was in the past.  Guanxi relies on the principle that deals grow out of relationships.[46]  Today, these relationships are still present, but not necessarily “superior” to Chinese local law.[47]  Contracts, for example, are still the basis for running a business.[48]  Guanxi is also changing because, with the insertion of western business ethics into the international community, the Chinese are becoming more cognizant of Guanxi’s negative impacts, such as Guanxi causing unfair competition, or the implications of ignoring corruption committed by someone in your Guanxi network.[49] A study in the Journal for International Business Studies found that “no support was found for the proposition that Chinese care more about relationships because those relationships, in turn, provide payoff in terms of Guanxi, favors, or the potential to be treated as an outsider if the relationship is damaged.”[50]  Thus, Guanxi may not be as important for Chinese business deals as the “Ping Pong Model” may suggest.

As stated earlier, it is widely accepted that China is characterized as a “high context culture,” which means that the culture emphasizes group interests above individual interests. However, in a 2009 study by Clyde A. Warden and Judy F. Chen, China was characterized as less “high context” than its Asian neighbors, such as Japan.[51]  With the growing presence of western business ideas in China, Chinese negotiators are increasingly accommodating western culture in their negotiations. The study showed that the Chinese respondents exhibited increased cultural accommodation when the counterpart’s culture was more distant (e.g. United States)—paying more attention to sacrificing self-interest and saving face for the other side.[52]

Although many western negotiators rely on the widely supported “Ping Pong Model” when negotiating with Chinese negotiator, it should not be the only source to rely on when studying Chinese business culture.  In fact, Chinese negotiators are learning western techniques, and hence, the Chinese business culture is evolving.  Chinese business culture, instead, should be seen as a combination of modern western ideas and traditional Chinese values.[53]

APPLYING THE “PING PONG MODEL” AND THE CHANGING CHINESE BUSINESS CULTURE TO NEGOTIATION

            So, how then do we apply what we just learned about Chinese negotiators?  Well to start, the first thing a western negotiator must recognize is that you may dealing with, on one extreme, a Chinese negotiator who believes that they are really predestined by heaven to rule above the barbarian horde, on the other extreme, a Chinese negotiator who believes the West surpassed them long ago and that western methods are genuinely better, or a Chinese negotiator that falls in the middle of these two extremes.[54]  Once the western negotiator realizes this, we can begin to analyze how to succeed in negotiating with a Chinese firm.  If negotiating with a person of traditional Chinese values, it would be wise to review the “Ping Pong Model” extensively.  If negotiating with a person who follows modern western ideas, be prepared for the Chinese negotiator to employ methods similar to your western methods.  However, you are most likely going to be in a room with several business people.  Everyone is unique in his or her own way.  Thus, they may very well all retain different negotiation tactics.  Therefore, one should be prepared to apply, not just the “Ping Pong Model” to their negotiation, but also the western negotiation tactics we, as westerners, are already familiar with, noting that you may have to use a combination of both the “Chinese” and “Western” models.

            I stress the need to be prepared for both a traditional Chinese negotiation style and a modern western negotiation style because Chinese business culture is always changing.  As Andrew Hupert states, “if the wind blows from the West, they’ll do their best to follow the conventions and role models of the US (when it comes to business).  If China is ascendant, they become super-nationalists.  (Ask an old-timer who was in Hong Kong when it was handed over from British control to China).  Both impulses are always present.”[55]  We can never predict how political and economic factors will affect someone’s mindset in the future.  We can only be prepared for both scenarios.  Moreover, there are conflicting reports on the current state of Sino-American business relations.  On the one end, the China Daily reports that Chinese firms in the US are upbeat, promoting how successful Chinese firms are there and espousing how easy it is to invest in the US.[56]  At the other end, the ChinaLawBlog.com submits that American companies are the ones adjusting to do business in China, but the Chinese companies refuse to do the same in the US.  An interviewee continues, “I am treated as suspect when I try to point out how things should be done in the United States, as though my believing there might be a better, non-Chinese way of doing something makes me anti-China.”[57]  In addition, in an article written by Maria Lai-Ling Lam, she explains that most Chinese expatriate interviewees “expect Americans to have a better understanding of the Chinese way of doing things,” and that “it’s much easier to educate the Americans than for the Chinese to change.”[58]  Given all of this, it only makes sense for the American negotiator to be educated in this subject.  One will never know what kind of negotiator he or she will be up against or what kind of environment one will find him or herself in.

Because this paper is geared towards the western negotiator, I will not address strategies for negotiating the western way.  Instead, I will provide a brief guide to applying negotiating strategies to the “Ping Pong Model.”  I will give advice in the order I laid out the “Ping Pong Model” above: addressing guo qing first, followed by religion, and then the Chinese stratagems.

To recall, Guo qing is China’s social and institutional factor.  Very generally, this means that the Chinese government is most likely involved with the Chinese enterprise you are negotiating with.  Since this is likely the case, one of the most important things the western negotiators should do is lobby before Chinese government authorities.  You will broker a successful deal with the Chinese firm if you can first show the government you are worth investing in.  You must convince the Chinese government that you are financially stable; that you have cutting-edge technologies; and that you are in it for the long haul.[59]  Additionally, part of guo qing is the recognition of the rapid change and backwardness of China, today.  Be cognizant, as mentioned previously, that the money-grabbing, nouveau-riche may utilize a more western-style, pragmatic, results-driven approach to business negotiations.[60]

The next component of the “Ping Pong Model” is religion.  Specifically, I will address how to conduct negotiations with regard to the six core values of Confucianism: moral cultivation, guanxi, family orientation, respect for seniority, pursuit of harmony/avoidance of conflict, and the preservation of “face.”

First, moral cultivation requires trust and sincerity.  Thus, trust building is essential.  Doing something like inviting a Chinese delegation to view your U.S. factories or inviting your Chinese counterparts to a concert or sporting event are appreciated ways of building trust.[61]  Also, a part of moral cultivation is the aversion to law.  Problems are better solved when you have a conversation as opposed to threatening legal action.[62]  This also applies to written contracts.  Elaborate written contracts and “aggressive, classical contracting” are considered rude and distasteful to Confucian ethical sensibilities.[63]

Second, Guanxi, despite recent trends, is still an important cultural influence on Chinese society.  Guanxi is this idea of having close relationships and connections with the people you do business with.  To do this, you continue the trust building, as set forth in the paragraph above.  You will get deals from relationships in China, rather than getting relationships out of deals.[64]  Moreover, continue to convince your Chinese partners of your goodwill and good intent, and you should be golden.[65]  Guanxi is also a concept of reciprocity.  The Chinese will expect you to make concession for concession.[66]  So, do not enter a negotiation without being prepared to concede something.

Third, the Chinese have a group/family orientation.  Negotiating there is a team sport.  There will be any associates around the negotiating table.  Do not be intimidated.  Simply be prepared for a large group of constituents.  The key, however, is to identify the real decision maker.[67]  This family orientation also applies to the Chinese way of thinking.  While westerners like to break everything down into individual elements and discuss them one at a time, Chinese people jump all over the place and ask many questions.[68]  It is their way discussing the big picture all at once.

Fourth, the Chinese have a great respect for their seniors and for hierarchy.  Americans tend to be adversarial and rude in negotiations.[69]  You must check this attitude at the door.  The senior business associates will not take kindly to this attitude.  Be polite and respectful.

Fifth is the concept of the pursuit of harmony and avoidance of conflict.  This also relates to Americans being adversarial.  Having a direct approach, to the Chinese, damages relationships.[70]  Therefore, when confronting conflicts, the Chinese seek to avoid the conflict in order to seek continued harmony.  Western negotiation styles will appear confrontational, competitive, and combative, which does not fare well amongst Chinese negotiators.[71]

Last is the preservation of “face.”  This is a concept of preventing embarrassment or loss of reputation.  By embarrassing a Chinese businessperson or tainting their reputation, would result in the “loss of face.”  This means westerns should avoid “constructive criticism.”[72]  Also, try and avoid saying “no” as this, too, can embarrass your Chinese counterpart.[73]  Furthermore, the display of negative emotions may be considered a “loss of face,” so keep a poker face.[74]

One last philosophical foundation in China is the need to be thrifty.  This means that negotiating a price will be a delicate subject.  One cannot ask for too high a price because it will insult the Chinese on the other side of the table.  Also note that because the Chinese are thrifty, they will most likely leave more wiggle room in price negotiations.  That means, come with multiple offers.[75]

The final component of the “Ping Pong Model” is Sun Tzu’s 36 Chinese stratagems.  Instead of going through each stratagem, one by one, I will provide a general analysis of the entire concept of these stratagems.  As you may recall, the Chinese stratagems are strategies for gaining material and psychological advantage over one’s adversary.[76]  If confronted with a negotiator using these stratagems, it is important to be firm on your offer and build credibility.[77]  Do not be fooled by their attempts to woo you with flattery.  Recognize these are just tactics and stay strong.  To leverage yourself over the Chinese party, you can use techniques such as “being indifferent” because indifference can preserve your leverage in any relationship.[78]  Another tactic would be to build relationships with other Chinese companies, so that if you need to walk away from a disagreeable company, you can fall back onto another company.  This would enable you to be self-sufficient.[79]

These suggestions are in no way exhaustive.  This paper is simply intended to be a brief guide on what a western negotiator can expect when negotiating with a Chinese entity, and what strategies or techniques can be employed in order to negotiate successfully in China.  The Chinese business culture I described is also not meant to be universally applicable to all the Chinese people.  Obviously, the Chinese are not all the same.  Like any other nation, there are people with many different types of personalities and character traits.[80]   There is no right or wrong way to negotiate in China.  It is all about studying your Chinese counterpart and determining which negotiation style or styles he or she will apply.  Your Chinese counterpart may be an older generation who relies on traditional Chinese values.  Your Chinese client might be of the younger generation and would prefer do away with the Chinese way of doing things.  This task of determining the proper method of approaching a Chinese negotiator is difficult but not impossible.



[1] Sun Tzu translated and annotated by Lionel Giles (2005). The Art of War by Sun Tzu – Special Edition. El Paso Norte Press.

[2] Andrew Hupert (2012). “Negotiating to Win in China,” available at <http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2012/10 /negotiating-to-win-in-china-part-3-sources-of-power/>.

[3] Tony Fang (1999). Chinese Business Negotiating Style. Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA.

[4] Pervez Ghauri & Tony Fang (2001). “Negotiating with the Chinese: A Socio-Cultural Analysis,” Journal of World Business 303-325 (Vol. 36, Issue 3).

[5] Asuman Akgunes & Robert Culpepper (2012). “Negotiations Between Chinese and Americans: Examining the Cultural Context and Salient Factors,” Journal of International Management Studies 191-200 (Vol. 7).

[6] Ghauri & Fang, supra note 4, at 308.

[7] James K. Sebenius & Cheng Qian (2008). “Cultural Notes on Chinese Negotiating Behavior,” Harvard Business School Working Paper Series 1-10. available at <http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/09-076.pdf>.

[8] Ghauri & Fang, supra note 4, at 308.

[9] Id. (this citation is for the entire paragraph from note 8 onwards).

[10] Sebenius & Cheng, supra note 7, at 2.

[11] Akgunes & Culpepper, supra note 5, at 195.

[12] Ghauri & Fang, supra note 4, at 309.

[13] Id.

[14] E. Allen Buttery & T.K.P. Leung (1998). “The Difference between Chinese and Western Negotiations,” European Journal of Marketing 379-389.

[15] Akgunes & Culpepper, supra note 5, at 194.

[16] Id.

[17] John L. Graham & N. Mark Lam (2003). “The Chinese Negotiation,” Harvard Business Review 82-91.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Akgunes & Culpepper, supra note 5, at 194 (this footnote is for the entire paragraph).

[21] Ghauri & Fang, supra note 4, at 310.

[22] Ghuari & Fang, supra note 4, at 312.

[23] Sebenius & Cheng, supra note 7, at 5.

[24] Chiao Chen (1981). “Chinese Strategic Behaviours: A Preliminary List,” Proceedings of the International Conference on Sinology. Academia Sinica: Taipei 429-440.

[25] Ghuari & Fang, supra note 4, at 312.

[26] Id. at 311-312.

[27] Id. at 312.

[28] Cheryl Rivers & Roger Volkema (2012). “East-West Differences in ‘Tricky’ Tactics: A Comparison of the Tactical Preferences of Chinese and Australian Negotiatiors,” Journal of Business Ethics.

[29] Sebenius & Cheng, supra note 7, at 5.

[30] Id.

[31] Ghuari & Fang, supra note 4, at 312.

[32] Id.

[33] Sebenius & Cheng, supra note 7, at 7.

[34] F. Peter Phillips (2009). “Commercial Mediation in China: Challenge of Shifting Paradigms,” Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The 2008 Fordham Papers 321-331.

[35] Id. at 329.

[36] Sebenius & Cheng, supra note 7, at 7.

[37] Id.

[38] Id. at 8.

[39] Id.

[40] J. Frankenstein (1993). “Towards the Year 2000 Some Strategic Speculations About International Business in China,” International Business in China 1-28, Routledge: London.

[41] Phillips, supra note 34, at 330.

[42] Sebenius & Cheng, supra note 7, at 8.

[43] Id.

[44] Id.

[45] Fang, supra note 3, at 100.

[46] Heidi von Weltzien Hoivik (2007). “East Meets West: Tacit Messages about Business Ethics in Stories Told by Chinese Managers,” Journal of Business Ethics (Vol. 74) 457-469.

[47] Id. at 461.

[48] Id.

[49] Id. at 463.

[50] Ray Friedman, Shu-Cheng Chi & Leigh Ann Liu (2006). “An Expectancy Model of Chinese-American Differences in Conflict-Avoiding,” Journal of International Business Studies (Vol. 37) 76-91.

[51] Clyde A. Warden & Judy F. Chen (2009). “Chinese Negotiators’ Subjective Variations in Intercultural Negotiations,” Journal of Business Ethics 529-537.

[52] Id. at 529.

[53] Sebenius & Cheng, supra note 7, at 9.

[54] Hupert, supra note 2.

[55] Id.

[56] Chen Weihua & Li Jiabao (Feb. 23, 2013). “Chinese Firms in US Upbeat,” China Daily, available at <http://www .chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-02/23/content_16250226.htm>.

[57] Dan Harris (May 23, 2012). “Will Chinese Firms Ever be ‘International’?,” China Law Blog, available at <http:// www.chinalawblog.com/2012/05/will-chinese-companies-ever-be-international.html>.

[58] Maria Lai-Ling Lam (2000). Working with Chinese Expatriates in Business Negotiations: Portraits, Issues, and Applications. Quorum Books: Westport, CT.

[59] Ghuari & Fang, supra note 4, at 312. (footnote is for the paragraph)

[60] Sebenius & Cheng, supra note 7, at 8.

[61] Ghuari & Fang, supra note 4, at 314. (footnote is for the paragraph)

[62] Akgunes & Culpepper, supra note 5, at 198.

[63] Rashmi Prasad & Yong Cao (2012). “Improving Negotiation Outcomes between American and Chinese Partners: A Framwork for Practice,” Journal of Applied Business Research (Vol. 28) 1-8.

[64] Hoivik, supra note 46, at 460.

[65] Prasad & Cao, supra note 63, at 5.

[66] Akgunes & Culpepper, supra note 5, at 197.

[67] Jack Perkowski (2011). “Negotiating in China: 10 Rules for Success,” Forbes.com, available at <http://www.for bes.com/sites/jackperkowski/2011/03/28/negotiating-in-china-10-rules-for-success/>.

[68] Akgunes & Culpepper, supra note 5, at 197.

[69] Hupert, supra note 2.

[70] Friedman, Chi & Liu, supra note 50, at 78.

[71] Prasad & Cao, supra note 64, at 4.

[72] Sebenius & Cheng, supra note 7, at 4.

[73] Akgunes & Culpepper, supra note 5, at 199.

[74] Prasad & Cao, supra note 64, at 4.

[75] Akgunes & Culpepper, supra note 5, at 198. (footnote for entire paragraph)

[76] Ghuari & Fang, supra note 4, at 310.

[77] Ghuari & Fang, supra note 4, at 316.

[78] Perkowski, supra note 67.

[79] Hupert, supra note 2.

[80] Duncan Freeman (1994). The Life and Death of a Joint Venture in China. Asia Law and Practice Ltd.: Hong Kong. at 10.

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